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ABSTRACT
This paper explores multilevel governance (MLG) in the context of state aid programmes for the 
diffusion of broadband in the European Union. By comparing three EU Member States (Italy, Spain 
and the UK), the qualitative analysis illustrates how MLG affects both the implementation of public 
interventions and the reduction of regional inequalities in the access to broadband. The analysis 
suggests that a distributed and shared governance is potentially beneficial for the implementation 
of state aid programmes, but its application is constrained by idiosyncrasies in the structure of the 
public and private sector.
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Introduction
Over the past twenty years national and local governments 
have significantly invested in the deployment of broadband 
networks, seen as essential inputs to reap the socio- 
economic benefits deriving from digital technologies 
(ITU, 2013). The performance of public interventions in 
broadband markets has, however, been questioned by var-
ious commentators, as neither public operators nor public- 
private partnerships have managed to enhance the effi-
ciency of broadband supply and reduce inequalities in the 
access to connectivity (Author et al., 2020; Valle De Souza 
et al., 2018).
Previous research has widely explored the complex and 
conflictual relationships existing between public and pri-
vate actors in broadband markets, leading public interven-
tions to fail or underperform (Author et al., 2020; Po-An 
Hsieh et al., 2012). More recently, scholars have also 
emphasised the tensions emerging across different levels 
of government involved in the policymaking of broadband 
markets (Author et al., 2019; Matteucci, 2020).
This paper aims to shed further light on the intricate 
set of horizontal and vertical relations underlying the 
design and implementation of public interventions in 
broadband markets, adopting the perspective of multi-
level governance (MLG). The latter has been often used 
to describe the policymaking process in the EU (Marks, 
1993) and has lately emerged as a framework to analyse 
complex policy issues, such as environmental sustain-
ability and territorial cohesion (Chardas, 2014; Homsy 
et al., 2019).
Consistent with Homsy et al. (2019), MLG is con-
ceived in this paper as the combination of multiple 
factors that allow the coordination and integration of 
decentralised decisions (Touati et al., 2019). These 
dimensions are applied to study the state aid pro-
grammes for broadband diffusion undertaken in three 
EU Member States (Italy, Spain and the UK). This com-
parison aims to expand the extant literature assessing 
MLG in broadband markets (Matteucci, 2020) but also 
provides further insights on the components of MLG 
conceptualised by Homsy et al. (2019).
With this in mind, the remainder of this paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on MLG, focusing on its application in the context of 
broadband policy. Following a detailed description of 
the methodology in Section 3, the three case studies are 
presented and analysed in Section 4. The findings are 
discussed in Section 5, and conclusions drawn in 
Section 6.
Multilevel governance: a review of the literature
MLG refers to systems of governance where authority is 
dispersed between various levels of government and 
across different sectors with responsibilities and powers 
being shared both horizontally (between actors at the 
same territorial levels) and vertically (between actors at 
different territorial levels) (Touati et al., 2019). The 
concept was first introduced by Marks (1993) to describe 
the plurality of state and non-state actors involved in the 
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decision-making processes within the EU and has been 
successively employed to explore policymaking pro-
cesses in various sectorial and geographic contexts 
(Chardas, 2014; Homsy et al., 2019; Potluka & Liddle, 
2014).
Researchers agree that MLG combine the benefits of 
a decentralised policymaking process, which ensures 
a better consideration of local instances, with the advan-
tages of a centralised coordination, enhancing the effi-
ciency of public interventions (Green & Orton, 2012; 
Touati et al., 2019). However, MLG also entails addi-
tional transaction costs that may eventually undermine 
the efficiency of the policy-making process (Matteucci, 
2020). In particular, such inefficiencies emerge from 
administrative issues and institutional tensions, reflect-
ing shortcomings in the institutional contexts and poli-
tical landscape wherein MLG is implemented (Del Pino 
& Pavolini, 2015; Milio, 2014).
The policymaking of telecommunications and broad-
band markets in the EU has often been described as an 
example of MLG, involving supranational, national and 
local actors (Simpson, 2011). In fact, the regulatory frame-
work designed and adopted by the EU institutions is 
enforced within Member States by various players at dif-
ferent geographic levels, such as the national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) overseeing the relationship between 
the former monopolists and their competitors, the national 
and regional agencies investing in broadband networks, the 
municipal councils granting permissions for the installa-
tion of telecommunications infrastructures (Falch & 
Henten, 2018).
Although previous research emphasised the plurality 
of public actors involved in broadband policymaking 
(Gómez-Barroso & Feijóo, 2010), little has been said so 
far on the interaction among them and its implications 
for the development of broadband markets. Scholars 
primarily debated the optimal degree of decentralisation 
with regard to sectoral regulation (Montolio & Trillas, 
2013; Simpson, 2011). Others have explored the conflic-
tual relationship between NRAs and EU institutions, 
emphasising the need for supranational coordination 
through regulatory networks (Mathieu, 2016).
The majority of previous studies maintained 
a dichotomic approach (supranational vs. national, centra-
lised vs. decentralised), which does not capture the hetero-
geneity of public interventions in broadband markets. In 
reality the relationship between local, national and supra-
national authorities is more complex and dynamic. Despite 
the common regulatory framework, the role of public actors 
has varied significantly across the EU Member States and 
over time, with the EU institutions supporting both 
national and local initiatives (Author et al., 2019, 2020).
This paper aims to explore and clarify the intricate 
interplay between supranational, national and local 
authorities as well as public, private and third-sector 
organisations involved in broadband markets, using 
MLG as a framework to analyse their relationships. 
Consistent with Homsy et al. (2019), MLG is conceptua-
lised as the combination of multiple components (co- 
production of knowledge, framing of co-benefits, capa-
city provision, engagement of civil society, coordinating 
and sanctioning role of the central authority).
These components reflect the horizontal and vertical 
relations that characterise MLG. The co-production of 
knowledge and the provision of capacity place emphasis 
on the exchange of information and resources among 
different levels of government to develop the necessary 
technical know-how and managerial expertise (Touati 
et al., 2019). The engagement of the civil society and fram-
ing of co-benefits are, instead, functional to motivate public 
interventions and build consensus around them (Homsy 
et al., 2019). Finally, the sanctioning and coordinating 
authority is needed to define a common framework and 
ensure consistency among local interventions (Green & 
Orton, 2012).
Methodology
A multiple case study analysis was employed to explore the 
MLG of broadband state aid across three EU Member 
States. The cross-country comparison was designed to 
enhance the external validity of this research, by highlight-
ing regularities across the EU broadband markets and 
contextual factors that affect the outcomes of MLG in 
each Member States (Yin, 2009).
To further enhance the validity and reliability of the 
analysis, multiple qualitative methods were employed 
(Jonsen & Jehn, 2009). As shown in Tables 1, 51 inter-
views were conducted between June 2016 and 
January 2019 with multiple stakeholders from public, 
private and third sector at national, supranational and 
subnational level. Purposive sampling was utilised to 
identify the most qualified and representative stake-
holders in each sector and country (Kovalainen & 
Eriksson, 2016). Participant observation (Kawulich, 
2005) was also employed to further explore the interac-
tion between these stakeholders. The primary data was 
integrated with secondary sources: policy documents, 
trade and local press, reports from consultancies, regu-
latory and audit authorities.
Both primary and secondary data were analysed with 
NVIVO, a software widely utilised to explore and orga-
nise the themes emerging from qualitative data (Welsh, 
2002). Recurring themes were identified for each case 
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study and then compared across the countries to map 
similarities and differences across the EU broadband 
market (Jonsen & Jehn, 2009).
State aid for broadband diffusion in the EU
The existence of market failures has motivated public 
intervention in EU broadband markets since the late 
1990s (Gómez-Barroso & Feijóo, 2010). Whereas early 
initiatives were autonomously led by local authorities 
(Author et al., 2018), in 2009 the EU adopted specific 
guidelines for state aid in broadband markets to ensure 
consistency among Member States (CERRE, 2018).
Based on the latest version of the guidelines 
(Communication 2013/C 332/01), state aid is only 
authorised in those areas where private suppliers have 
not invested within three years. These areas are identi-
fied through open consultations where private operators 
report their current and planned investment in broad-
band networks. Subsidies are then allocated through 
competitive tenders, managed by either local authorities 
or national agencies. Once completed, the subsidised 
networks are subject to regulation by NRAs.
The EU guidelines do not include specific indications 
on the governance of state aid, that “can be used at the 
national, regional or local level” (para. 10). However, 
paragraph 43 suggests that Member States could “set 
up national competence centres to help small, local 
authorities to design adequate State aid measures and 
ensure consistency in the application of the State aid 
rules”. The importance of “ensur[ing] a high level of 
transparency” is also stressed to “ensure consistency 
and coordination of the local interventions” (para. 40).
All state aid programmes are subject to the scrutiny of 
DG-COMP, which validates the compliance of such 
interventions with the EU legislation on state aid. 
Between 2003 and 2018, DG-COMP analysed 162 cases 
of state aid, raising objections in only three of them (EC, 
2019a). Despite the common framework, the implemen-
tation of state aid in broadband markets has varied 
significantly across the EU with a plurality of ownership 
and funding models being employed over the years 
(CERRE, 2018). The following subsections provide 
a detailed analysis of how state aid has been implemen-
ted in the case study countries.
UK
Public interventions in support of broadband diffusion 
have been ongoing across the UK since the early 2000s. 
Initially were the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
to subsidise the rollout of ADSL in rural areas (EC, 2019a). 
A nationwide strategy was only adopted in 2010 (BIS, 
2010), when Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK), an agency 
of the (now) Department for Digital, Culture Media & 
Sport (DDCMS), was created to lead public interventions 
in the superfast broadband1 market.
The latter have been implemented by regional public- 
private partnerships (PPPs) between the local County 
Councils and private suppliers selected through competi-
tive tenders (National Audit Office, 2012). These PPPs have 
been funded by a mix of public and private resources, with 
some also utilising subsidies from the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) (BDUK, 2019; Gerli & 
Whalley, 2018).
The government established BDUK as a national com-
petence centre (NCC), in charge of managing the notifica-
tions to DG-COMP, overseeing the allocation of subsidies 
across the PPPs and monitoring the execution of their 
projects (EC, 2016). Interviewees agreed on the advantages 
of having a central authority coordinating the local partner-
ships, as “the standardisation that [BDUK] gives around the 
projects” made regional interventions “much more efficient 
than if the local bodies were free to pursue these projects in 
the way that they believed it was the right way” (Interview 
UK11)
However, efficiency of BDUK framework has been ques-
tioned by other stakeholders. In particular, the National 
Audit Office (2012) concluded that the value-for-money of 
BDUK has been compromised by the lack of competition 
among private suppliers. In fact, all subsidies in the first 
phase of BDUK programme were awarded to British 
Table 1. Summary of primary data collection.
Italy Spain UK Total
Interviews 18 8 25 51
National administration 4 1 2 7
Local administration 3 3 4 10
Broadband providers 5 2 8 15
Representatives of residential and business end-users 6 2 11 19
Ethnography 1 1 2 4
Meetings between local authorities and local communities - - 2 2
Meetings between local, national and EU authorities 1 1 - 2
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Telecom (BT), the former monopolist in the UK telecom-
munications market. Overall, the ability of BDUK and EU 
institutions to safeguard and promote competition for state 
aid was questioned. The former was accused of “chang[ing] 
the rules very quickly on BT’s request” (Interview UK3), 
while EU institutions were perceived as passive and distant 
as they “should do something but there is nobody in Europe 
that can be asked for anything . . . ” (Interview UK 1).
Furthermore, BDUK was accused of neglecting the 
differences existing between the counties. The compar-
ison of local projects highlighted how their objectives 
and resources varied significantly with some councils 
expected to achieve, at the end of the programme, 
a final coverage way below the national target. As high-
lighted by the public manager of a regional PPP, the 
relationship between local authorities and BDUK was 
sometimes conflictual, since the priorities of the latter 
were not always aligned with the needs of the former:
We fight our corner - and this sometimes is the right 
description with BDUK, so that they understand the 
needs of County B rather than just understanding the 
needs of the national programme. I spend a lot of time 
with BDUK explaining why we need to do something in 
County B that may be a bit different to the normal 
(Interview UK10)
Local authorities were also expected to liaise with local 
stakeholders and keep them informed about the broadband 
projects (BDUK, 2011). The board of most regional PPPs 
included elected representatives of local communities (dis-
trict and parish councillors) and members of various inter-
est groups (local charities, chambers of commerce, local 
enterprise partnerships, etc.). Nevertheless, the ability of 
these actors to effectively communicate and engage with 
local communities was questioned by, among others, the 
public manager of a regional PPP:
We keep oiling the process (. . .) this meeting this morn-
ing was a regular quarterly meeting and we’ve represen-
tatives of the District Councils and representatives of 
the Parish Councils, National Parks, the police, Health 
authority . . . but what we don’t know is whether they go 
back and tell their people (Interview UK10)
Interviews and ethnographic analysis highlighted the acti-
vism of local communities, lobbying for faster broadband 
and exerting pressure on BDUK and regional PPPs to have 
their villages included in their projects. Secondary data also 
confirmed that many residents and businesses directly took 
part in the open consultations run by regional authorities 
for the definition of white areas (Welsh Government, 2017). 
Based on the interviews, the interaction between broadband 
campaigners and local authorities varied significantly even 
within the same area. For example, in County A, some 
interviewees described their County Council as “very 
supportive” (Interview UK12), while others complained 
that “they don’t seem to do anything to help the commu-
nities” (Interview UK18).
However, the detractors of regional PPPs admitted 
that County Councils “have had all the criticism for poor 
delivery, but actually it isn’t their fault, it’s about the 
contract” (Interview UK20). The framework designed 
by BDUK was criticised for the confidentiality clause 
which limited the ability of local authorities to “tell you 
when you’re getting the service” (Interview UK20) and “to 
look at their BT’s invoice and compare it with another 
local authority’s invoice” (Interview UK19). The ability 
of local councils to manage the PPPs was further com-
promised by the fact that “they didn’t have the resources 
to manage the projects effectively” (Interview UK19).
Interviewees stressed that the knowledge of broadband 
technology “was not homogenous” across local authorities 
(Interview UK16). Whereas some had gained experience 
through the management of local networks, others “did not 
have enough expertise to be able to take on the weight of deal 
with BT, which is a huge business and who effectively holds 
all the cards” (Interview UK9). More generally the ability of 
local authorities to manage the partnerships was con-
strained by the lack of qualified employees resulting from 
the adoption of austerity policies, as admitted by the IT 
manager of a regional authority:
Austerity has kicked in . . . (. . .) if I look at my ICT budget, 
for example, I would have about 60% less money that 
I started with 5 years ago . . . (Interview UK2)
Spain
Since the late 1990s, both regional and national inter-
ventions have coexisted in the Spanish broadband mar-
kets. Regional authorities have often built public 
broadband networks, managed by either public opera-
tors or PPPs (CERRE, 2018). The national government 
has, instead, subsidised private deployments in rural 
areas through multiple nationwide plans, the latest of 
which (launched in 2012) is known as Plan Extension 
Banda Ancha (PEBA) (EC, 2010, 2013).
PEBA has been entirely managed by the State 
Secretary for Telecommunications and the Information 
Society (SESIAD), acting as the NCC. After identifying 
the areas eligible for public intervention through annual 
public consultations, SESIAD allocates subsidies and 
loans (financed from both national and ERDF funding) 
on a municipal basis through competitive tenders. The 
whole process is nationally led, without the involvement 
of municipalities or regions, as lamented by the repre-
sentative of a regional administration:
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The role of the regional government in this pro-
gramme has been, especially since 2011, limited to 
reading the plans: its participation has not been 
required for the definition of the programme, or the 
analysis of the needs or the ex-post evaluations 
(Interview ES8)
Not only were local authorities excluded from the gov-
ernance of PEBA: the latter also did not include any 
mechanism to engage with local stakeholders, apart 
from the open consultations mandated by the EU guide-
lines. The participation in the latter was limited to pri-
vate suppliers and public authorities, with only ten 
responses received from other actors (primarily busi-
nesses). The engagement of local authorities was also 
heterogeneous over the years: in 2013 only seven regions 
and four municipalities submitted responses, but four 
years later 14 regions and 42 municipalities participated 
in the consultation (Mincotur, 2013, 2017).
In 2014, the Spanish Parliament approved a new 
Telecommunications Law that defined broadband policy 
as an exclusive competence of the national government. 
This was followed by the Royal Decree 462/2015 that 
gave SESIAD the powers to coordinate and supervise the 
interventions of local authorities. The need for such 
coordination was agreed by many interviewees, who 
criticised municipal and regional initiatives as “some 
kind of showcase” (Interview ES1) pursuing “more 
a political goal than a real goal of improving competition” 
(Interview ES3).
Nevertheless, the recent measures adopted by the 
national government do not automatically exclude 
local authorities from the Spanish broadband market. 
Being consulted on the legitimacy of region-wide public 
networks, the NRA concluded that local authorities can 
maintain their infrastructure as long as the latter are 
managed by separate entities (CNMC, 2014). Despite 
the push towards the centralisation of the public inter-
vention, regional authorities have recently launched new 
initiatives, employing ERDF funding directly obtained 
from the EC (Observation ES1). This may exacerbate 
tensions existing within the market:
The EC gives funds directly to the Regions (. . .) it’s 
complicated because the Regions have funds to do 
something that they don’t have full competences for. 
So there are also a lot of tensions now, not only regio-
nal-national but national-DG Connect (Interview ES1)
Furthermore, the increasing centralisation has not 
affected the powers of local authorities with regard to 
the administration of civil engineering works. Whereas 
the collaboration between public operators and munici-
palities has historically been “smooth and beneficial” 
(ES0EPb), because “we’re public, they’re public and 
(. . .) there’s no problem to agree with these municipalities 
to use their ducts” (Es0EPa), commercial operators still 
struggled to cooperate with local administrators even 
when they were deploying broadband networks as part 
of PEBA. As reported by a manager of the Spanish 
incumbent:
You’ve to deal with a lot of Local Councils . . . with 
different regulations, there’s some kind of harmonisa-
tion that the Ministry made through the Telecom Bill 
(. . .) but in the end you’ve to deal with them, go there, 
explain the project. (. . .) sometimes it’s difficult to 
explain, because the people ’ou’re talking to have not 
detailed knowledge (Interview ES3)
Italy
The Italian broadband market was initially characterised 
by the intervention of local utilities who have, since the 
late 1990s, deployed public networks in many cities and 
provinces, especially in the northern regions. These 
initiatives preceded the adoption of state aid rules spe-
cific to broadband markets and were often accused of 
“creating imbalances and harming the market” 
(Interview IT3) because they were unfairly competing 
with private providers. Their development has, however, 
stopped since the late 2000s, when “a progressive reduc-
tion of the resources available to local authorities has led 
to a drop, even drastic, of their investments, especially in 
infrastructures” (Interview IT5).
The Italian government adopted its first national 
broadband plan in 2009 (EC, 2009), but its imple-
mentation was delegated to the regional authorities, 
despite in 2003 the Ministry of Economic 
Development (MISE) had established Infratel, 
a public company in charge of executing and coordi-
nating public interventions in support of broadband 
diffusion (Infratel, 2018). The situation has changed 
since 2011, when MISE launched a new plan for the 
diffusion of superfast broadband (Piano Banda 
Ultralarga, hereinafter ‘Piano BUL’), followed by 
Strategia Banda Ultralarga’ (hereinafter ‘Strategia 
BUL’) in March 2015. Both programmes have been 
primarily managed by Infratel, with limited involve-
ment of the regional authorities, as clarified by 
a representative of the Italian government:
The control is substantially centralised (. . .) The role of 
the Regions has been absolutely marginal, limited to 
that of facilitator, meaning that they arranged meetings 
at local level to explain what was happening, to favour 
the collaboration with the company who is going to 
intervene . . . (Interview IT15)
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Such centralisation was positively perceived by representa-
tives of both national and local administrations. 
A spokesperson of MISE commented that “the previous 
fragmentation impeded a uniform development across the 
country” (Interview IT16), while a member of the Research 
Council for rural economy concluded that national coordi-
nation was necessary to avoid a “proliferation of red tape 
and decisional centres” (Interview IT14). The oversight of 
Infratel was also praised for reducing the burden of 
“bureaucracy, especially with the EU”, described by 
a regional administrator as “the biggest obstacle for the 
execution of the regional project” (Interview IT1).
On the other hand, representatives of local authorities 
lamented the limited engagement in the management of 
public interventions as they were not consulted before the 
implementation of broadband projects within their admin-
istrative area (Observation IT1, Interview IT6). The 
mechanisms normally put in place to engage with external 
stakeholders also proved ineffective. The public consulta-
tions run by Infratel (2015, 2017) only involved private 
suppliers. Likewise, the participation of local actors in the 
“conferenze dei servizi” (multi-stakeholder meetings man-
dated by the Italian administrative law) was not homoge-
neous, as clarified by a manager of Infratel:
There were regions where all the municipalities took 
part and immediately gave all the authorisations. In 
other regions, instead, the participation to the ‘confer-
enze dei servizi’ was very limited, hence they have been 
unsuccessful, and we had to go and negotiate with every 
single municipality (Interview IT9)
This affected the relationship between private suppliers 
and local authorities, which emerged as a major con-
straint on the prompt execution of broadband projects 
across Italy. Private providers involved in public initia-
tives experienced “significant inefficiencies in terms of 
costs and time” due to the “limited collaboration of 
local authorities in the release of permits for civil engi-
neering works” (Interview IT11). Despite the rules 
adopted at EU and national level to streamline the roll-
out of broadband networks, municipalities and other 
public entities kept applying their own conditions, as 
explained by a representative of a regional authority:
Telecommunications are ruled by an ad hoc law (. . .) do 
you know it? Unfortunately nobody does. This law says 
that you cannot ask for bank guarantees, that you must 
release the permits within 30 days, even that you must 
make available the existing infrastructures at no cost . . . 
but nobody applies the law, they follow their own reg-
ulation. (Interview IT1)
Interviewees agreed that such misconduct was justified 
by the fact that local administrators “were not adequately 
informed on the plan and its goals” (Interview IT11) but 
also did not “understand the importance of broadband 
projects for their community and (. . .) were more con-
cerned with the conditions of the roads” (Interview IT9). 
Nevertheless, the conflictual relationship with local 
authorities also emanated from idiosyncrasies in the 
Italian administrative system, as emphasised by the 
national association of local councils:
Municipalities have autonomy in all the issues regarding 
the governance of the territory. For example, if 
a municipality says that, for any excavation (. . .) regard-
less of its size, the entire road has to be renovated, the 
municipality has the ability of doing it. (Interview IT5)
Discussion
Despite the variety of approaches adopted across the 
case studies, the comparison showed a common trend 
towards the centralisation of broadband policymaking, 
combined with an increasing reliance on public-private 
partnerships. In all countries, NCCs were established as 
the coordinating and sanctioning authorities in charge 
of nationwide state aid programmes replacing the 
autonomous initiatives of regional and municipal autho-
rities that characterised the first decade of 2000s.
The role of local authorities in the nationwide pro-
grammes changed across the countries but, their overall 
contribution to broadband policymaking has significantly 
reduced. Even when formally involved in the execution of 
state aid programmes, local authorities struggled to direct 
and monitor the local projects, because austerity policies 
and political parties adverse to the devolution of powers 
had compromised the provision of capacity at a local level. 
As a result, commercial suppliers were de facto able to take 
advantage of their market power (reflecting structural fail-
ures in broadband markets) and control the allocation of 
public subsidies.
Nevertheless, the analysis highlighted how local admin-
istrators could influence the implementation of broadband 
projects regardless of their formal involvement in the gov-
ernance of these initiatives, because of idiosyncrasies in the 
administrative system. In Italy and Spain, the powers 
assigned by administrative and constitutional laws to local 
authorities allowed them to engage in opportunistic beha-
viours that forced NCCs and commercial suppliers to 
change their plans and revise their budgets.
A clear tension emerged between national and local 
actors, as well as between public and private partners. 
NCCs and commercial suppliers lamented the limited 
support of local stakeholders, while the latter accused 
the others of neglecting the instances of local commu-
nities and pursuing commercial goals rather than the 
public interest. Whereas these issues are well 
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documented in the literature on MLG and PPPs – see, 
for example, Po-An Hsieh et al. (2021) and Green and 
Orton (2012), p. – our analysis also highlighted that such 
constraints were mitigated when the key components of 
MLG identified by Homsy et al. (2019) were adequately 
implemented.
In particular, the comparison emphasised how the 
engagement of the civic society (when effectively enforced) 
helped to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of state aid 
programmes, by enabling the co-production of knowledge 
and the framing of co-benefits. For example, making local 
stakeholders aware of broadband benefits contributed to 
raise consensus among local administrators in Italy and 
reduce their opposition to broadband deployments. 
Likewise in the UK, the collaboration with the civic society 
allowed local authorities to gain in-depth knowledge on the 
local territory and its potential demand.
However, the involvement of third-sector organisa-
tions and other stakeholders was inconsistent across the 
case study countries. This demonstrates the ineffective-
ness of the mechanisms currently mandated by national 
and supranational regulations to consult and engage 
with external stakeholders. Furthermore, this variance 
is consistent with the different level of citizenship acti-
vism observed in the case study countries (Hoskins et al., 
2006), but also reflects different attitudes in the political 
landscape at national and local level.
In particular, the active participation of local stake-
holders in the governance of broadband projects 
depended on the political commitment of both national 
and local actors to cooperate and support the execution 
of broadband projects. Such cooperation was affected by 
the views of local autonomy that dominated the political 
landscape: across the case countries, the collaboration 
between local and national authorities decreased imme-
diately after the electoral success of parties historically 
adverse to the devolution of powers (Del Pino & 
Pavolini, 2015).
These findings have a number of theoretical implica-
tions. First, they contributed to clarify the relationships 
existing among the different components of MLG. 
Secondly, they highlighted those factors affecting the effec-
tive enforcement of MLG. Both are represented in Figure 1.
The establishment of coordinating and sanctioning 
authorities is embedded in national and supranational 
regulations (Figure 1, point 1) that determines the gov-
ernance structure of public interventions. However, 
administrative entities have powers assigned to them 
by pre-existing national laws. This may generate 
a tension between national and local actors, with the 
latter exerting their functions to influence the local 
implementation of centrally coordinated and designed 
programmes (Figure 1, point 2).
This conflictual relationship between local and national 
authorities strengthens the position of private partners 
(Figure 1, point 3), which is also affected by idiosyncrasies 
in the market structure, such as the level of market compe-
tition. The latter determines to what extent private suppliers 
have market power and can leverage information asymme-
tries to influence the governance of PPPs. A tension 
between public and private actors can, therefore, emerge, 
when private suppliers have excessive powers while the 
provision of capacity in the public sector (especially at 
a local level) is limited (Figure 1, point 4).
Figure 1. Factors affecting the components of MLG and their relationship. Source: developed by the authors, based on the findings and 
Homsy et al. (2019).
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The provision of capacity is affected by the political 
landscape wherein public interventions are conceived 
and implemented (Figure, point 5). The governance of 
the latter can be shared among different administrative 
levels, but the actual contribution of each public actor 
depends on whether they have the human and financial 
resources to manage the projects. Therefore, if the ruling 
parties are against the devolution of powers or adopt 
austerity measures, this is likely to compromise the 
effective participation of local authorities to MLG.
These tensions emerging between actors at different 
geographic levels and from different sectors can be miti-
gated when the other dimensions of MLG are effectively 
enforced. As shown in Figure 1 (point 6), the co-production 
of knowledge help to enhance the collaboration of public 
and private partners, by integrating the capacity of local 
actors. Sharing knowledge also helps to create trust among 
national and local partners and prevent the emergence of 
conflicts between different vertical levels (Figure 1, point 7).
The framing of co-benefits also contributed to generate 
consensus around nationwide programmes, by making 
local actors aware of the benefits that such interventions 
have for the local communities (Figure 1, point 7). 
Furthermore, translating co-benefits in common objectives 
reinforces the collaboration between public and private 
actors (Figure 1, point 6).
Both the co-production of knowledge and the fram-
ing of co-benefits largely depend on the level of civic 
society engagement (Figure 1, point 8), which in turn is 
affected by the frameworks governing public interven-
tions and the political landscape where the latter take 
place. National and supranational regulations can man-
date the consultation of external stakeholders through 
calls for inputs or formal meetings. The effectiveness of 
these mechanisms, is however, compromised if the levels 
of active citizenship are limited and the political system 
is close to the input of external stakeholders.
Overall, our analysis suggested that MLG is just 
a political promise if specific measures are not put in 
place to effectively enforce the five components identified 
by Homsy et al. (2019). The engagement of the civic society 
is key to enable the framing of co-benefits and the co- 
production of knowledge (Figure 1, point 8), which are 
fundamental to mitigate those tensions potentially emer-
ging among actors from different administrative levels and 
sectors (Figure 1, points 6 and 7). The provision of capacity 
at a local level is also necessary to ensure a balanced govern-
ance and allow local authorities to effectively collaborate 
with other partners and comply with the indications of the 
sanctioning and coordinating authority (Figure 1, point 4).
The comparison also reinforced the view that MLG is 
the only approach possible for complex policy interventions 
that involve market and non-market actors at different 
geographic levels. In fact, local actors can still influence 
the implementation of such programmes, regardless of 
whether they are formally involved or not, due to idiosyn-
crasies in the administrative system that cannot be easily 
changed by supranational or national regulations (Figure 1, 
point 2). Our analysis, however, demonstrated that the 
framing of co-benefits and the co-production of knowledge 
can mitigate the conflicts emerging between national and 
local actors (Figure 1, point 7).
Furthermore, the combination of a coordinating and 
sanctioning authority with the input of local actors, includ-
ing the civil society, ensures a better balance between public 
and private partners, especially when the latter have signifi-
cant market power because of idiosyncrasies in the market 
structure (Figure 1, point 4). However, this requires an 
adequate provision of capacity at a local level that can 
only be achieved if the political landscape support MLG 
and the involvement of civil society and local authorities in 
the governance of public programmes (Figure 1, point 5).
Conclusion
By comparing the governance of state aid for broadband 
diffusion across three European countries, this paper has 
contributed to the debate on the efficiency and effective-
ness of the MLG. The analysis has suggested that 
a distributed and shared governance is beneficial for 
the implementation of public policies. Centralised coor-
dination can generate economies in the administration 
of public interventions as well as ensure their homoge-
neous distribution within the Member States, while the 
involvement of local stakeholders is crucial to design 
and implement place-based policies that better address 
the needs of local communities (Green & Orton, 2012).
Across the case study countries, the effective application 
of MLG principles was constrained by countervailing 
forces: the push towards the centralisation of public inter-
ventions – favoured by austerity policies and the victory of 
political parties hostile towards local autonomy – and the 
risks of opportunistic behaviours locally – facilitated by 
idiosyncrasies in the administrative system (Del Pino & 
Pavolini, 2015; Milio, 2014). In this scenario, private part-
ners could de facto control the design and implementation 
of public policy, especially when market competition and 
active citizenship are limited. This latter aspect has been 
largely overlooked by the extant literature on MLG and 
needs to be further researched to clarify its relevance across 
different policy areas and industrial sectors.
Further research is also needed to explore new ways to 
enforce stakeholder engagement as our analysis showed the 
ineffectiveness of the formal mechanisms currently man-
dated by EU and national regulations. Particular attention 
should be paid to idiosyncrasies in the institutional 
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frameworks and the level of active citizenship within the 
Member States, as both factors were found to shape the 
effective participation of local stakeholders to the policy-
making process.
As the application of MLG has been recently advo-
cated in many policy areas, from climate change to 
smart cities (Anand & Navío-Marco, 2018), a number 
of recommendations for policymakers and practitioners 
can also be derived from our paper. First, the principles 
of MLG should be embedded in future interventions to 
promote digitisation, as the participation of multiple 
stakeholders to the design and implementation of these 
policies is likely to enhance the effectiveness of these 
initiatives and counterbalance the power of private 
partners.
Secondly, the role of EU institutions in MLG should 
be revised to maximise the benefits of its supervisory 
role and promote best practices for the implementation 
of public policies. In the context of the EU broadband 
market, the existence of an EU oversight neither pre-
vented nor halted distortive behaviours emerging during 
the implementation of state aid, as the control exerted by 
DG-COMP solely focused on the adherence of the pro-
posed initiatives to the EU regulatory framework. There 
was no evidence that the evaluation of these projects 
took into account the lessons learnt from previous initia-
tives. Consequently, the potential benefits of 
a supranational coordination never materialised, 
thereby questioning the effective contribution of the 
EU institutions to the MLG of state aid programmes.
A greater involvement of regulatory authorities in 
MLG is also desirable to ensure consistency between 
state aid programmes and sectoral regulation. Based on 
EC guidelines, NRAs were expected to supervise the 
implementation of state aid programmes. Although the 
projects notified to DG-COMP generally emphasises the 
involvement of NRAs in the monitoring and regulation 
of public programmes, the comparison revealed that 
only the Italian NRA has exercised these functions. 
Additional research is, therefore, needed to clarify 
those structural and contextual factors affecting the par-
ticipation of regulatory authorities to the MLG of public 
interventions in the EU.
Note
1. Superfast broadband refer to broadband networks deli-
vering a minimum download speed of 30 Mbit/s (EC, , 
2019a). This implies the (at least partial) replacement of 
existing copper loops with newly-installed optic fibre.
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